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Thomas Nowotny (Wien)
Markets, Democracy and Social Capital
Entgegen seinen Versprechungen hat der Kommunismus wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und
Modernisierung nicht beschleunigt. Die von ihm betroffenen Zentral- / Osteuropäischen Staaten sind
in ihrer Entwicklung vielmehr hinter jenen Staaten zurückgeblieben, die vor 70 Jahren noch gleich
arm wie sie waren, die sich aber inzwischen dem europäischen Durchschnitt angenähert haben. In
der Transformationskrise nach 1990 ist diese Kluft sogar noch breiter geworden. Es gibt keinen
Anhaltspunkt für die These, dass die große Dauer und Tiefe dieser Transformationskrise durch eine
vorschnelle und zu vollständige Demokratisierung verursacht worden wäre. Im Gegenteil: jene Staaten
mit den höchsten demokratischen Standards sind auch jene, die ihre Wirtschaft am wirksamsten
umgestaltet haben. Erfolgreiche Demokratisierung und erfolgreiche Wirtschaftsreform scheinen also
die selbe tieferliegende Ursache zu haben: funktionierende gemeinschaftliche Einrichtungen sind in
beiden Bereichen unerlässlich. Gut funktionieren können solche Einrichtungen aber nur dann, wenn
sie sich auf ausreichendes und passendes „Sozialkapital“ von wechselseitigem Vertrauen und
Bereitschaft zur Zusammenarbeit stützen können. Die Zerstörung dieses Kapitals zählt zu den
schädlichsten Erbstücken, die der Kommunismus hinterlassen hat. Je weiter entfernt ein ex-
kommunistisches Land von den traditionellen Zentren der europäischen Modernisierung, desto
drückender die Last dieses Erbes.
Introduction
The gap in wealth that today separates the
countries of Central/Eastern Europe from those
in the Western part of the continent is wider than
it has ever been in history. Largely, this is due
to the inefficiencies and distortions of the former
Communist economic regime. But even after the
demise Communism it has taken very long for
economic growth to steady and accelerate. Over-
all, the process of  “catching up” has been slower
than expected (Kolodko 1999; Hochreiter 1994).
These economic problems interlink with politi-
cal ones. And in fact, they parallel one another.
While it is true that democratic transition pre-
ceded economic transformation, it is also true
that the least democratic and politically least
liberal countries are also those that had done
least to reform their economies. The track record
of the countries of the region is very uneven.
Differences between them too, are greater than
ever.
It is argued that institutional deficiencies are
the main cause of the problems both in the po-
litical and in the economic sphere (Havrylyshyn/
Roden 1999). Not that Western-type institutions
would not exist. They do. But the problem is
that frequently these institutions fail to function
properly (Nowotny 1998). There seems to be
something inherent in societies itself, in their
routines, norms, cultures that permits the proper
working of institutions or, on the other side,
condemns them to irrelevance and inefficiency.
The – certainly vague-notion of “social capi-
tal” – is introduced to circumscribe some of the
social relations and norms that have to under-
pin public political and economic institutions
(Putnam 1993); and it is argued that it is the
failure to amass social capital (like trust) around
these public institutions that makes them func-
tion so very badly in some of the “transition
countries”.
The Growing Gap
Since 1989/1990, one overarching vision has
guided the transition countries of Central-East-
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ern Europe. It was the vision to “re-join” Eu-
rope. The aim was to resemble as closely as
possible the countries in the Western part of the
continent; to become not only wealthy and eco-
nomically efficient, but also solidly and reliably
democratic. This called for a profound economic
transformation, but also for the transition to, and
the consolidation of democracy.
It was the prevailing view – also enshrined in
a many international documents – that both of
these aims would not only be mutually compat-
ible, but that they would re-enforce one another.
The faster and the more complete economic
transformation and reform, the better the
chances to become a fully developed democ-
racy. And vice versa: the more successful demo-
cratic consolidation, the better also the chances
to catch up economically with the wealthier parts
of Europe.
This view was not shared universally. A few
doubters maintained that there would be no prec-
edent in history for countries having reached
both goals at the same time (Balcerowicz 1995;
Lin 1997). Those sceptics stipulated that one
could, or should accord priority to just one of
these tasks. In actual practice and in the course
of history, one had either pushed for increased
wealth1  or for democratic reform. To pursue
both of these goals with equal determination
would be too complex an undertaking.
But is this indeed what the more recent expe-
rience in Central/Eastern Europe teaches us?
Let us start though with one more general
observation. Looking around in today’s world,
we find that the majority of very poor states is
not democratic, whereas – without exception –
all democracies are market economies and the
very vast majority of them very wealthy at that.
There is a clear correlation, therefore, between
the degree of wealth, of “modernisation” and
“marketisation” on the one hand, and the de-
gree of democratisation and political liberty on
the other.
But does such a correlation also hold true for
countries that have been Communist? Is the
political transition of the post Communist coun-
tries nothing but yet one other step in a secular,
global process of modernisation that makes
countries not only wealthier, but that transforms
Table 1
Wealth and Democracy
Low Income Countries
Lower Middle Income Countries
Upper Middle Income Countries
High Income Countries
Source: Freedom House 2000.
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them – more or less inevitably – into democra-
cies? Does the transformation of these formerly
Communist countries into democracies conform
to previous patterns of democratisation in other
formerly non-democratic countries?
This question is not redundant because the so-
called transition countries were – and still are –
in a special position. Communism was histori-
cally unique. Experience in other parts of the
world therefore could not provide an answer as
to what would happen after the end of Commu-
nism. This is because the “modernisation”
brought about by Communism did differ sig-
nificantly from the process of modernisation as
it occurred in other middle-income countries.
Such basic differences might have become ob-
scured by some appearances of outward simi-
larity. Because in the Communist countries too
there was:
– a shift from agricultural to industrial produc-
tion
– accelerated urbanisation
– emergence of a broad, urban middle class
– high rate of literacy and a high quantitative
and qualitative level of education
– plenty of other social services that were pro-
vided to the public
– important infrastructure projects
– greater equality in the distribution of wealth
and income
All of the above developments characterise
modernisation also in other parts of the world.
But as has become evident by now, the process
of modernisation induced by Communism in
Central/Eastern Europe was different nonethe-
less. It was shallow. It brought a “modernisa-
tion” less complete than the one that occurred
in the non Communist countries of Europe.
The level and growth of the GDP is a rather
good indicator for the speed and depth of mod-
ernization. Some countries that have a high per
capita GDP might not be very “modern” – es-
pecially if their wealth results but from the ex-
port of just a few raw materials. Inversely, some
countries might benefit from a highly modern
economy that employs much capital and that
uses advanced technologies. Their civil society,
their social norms and values, and their politi-
cal culture might nonetheless still reflect pre-
modern times. By and large though, these are
exceptions. By and large, the figures for the per
capita GDP still provide a rather good gauge
for the level of modernisation.
Using this gauge, we find that overall the
modernization was retarded by Communism.
Countries that were equally poor at the outset
but had developed under a market system and
(at least for some time) under democratic rule,
are wealthier and thus more “modern” than
countries which had to develop under a Com-
munist regime.
The following Table 2 shows the per capita
GDP of various European countries in 1934 and
in 1992. The comparison is done in purchasing
power parities and the figures show to what
extent the wealth thus measured differed from
the European average. As we can see, all for-
merly poor countries that chose a “capitalist way
of development” were able to improve their rela-
tive position;2 whereas the formerly poor coun-
tries that took the Communist path are all now
further removed from the average now than they
had been in 1934.
Table 2
Comparisons in PPP Income 1934 and 1992
Selected Communist and non-Communist
European Countries
(in 1990 USD, relative to the European average)
1934 1992
Germany 1,2 1,25
France 1,11 1,16
Austria 0,71 1,11
Finland 0,83 0,95
Italy 0,81 1,05
Ireland 0,75 0,76
Spain 0,51 0,81
Turkey 0,32 0,29
Bulgaria 0,31 0,26
Czech/Slova. 0,72 0,44
Romania 0,48 0,31
Poland 0,48 0,31
Hungary 0,63 0,36
Yugoslavia 0,32 0,27
Source: Maddison 1995.
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Running Parallel: Democratisation and
Economic Reform
Clearly thus, Communism had set these coun-
tries on a different road of development, and
the question is as to whether these differences
are weighty enough to exempt the ex-Commu-
nist countries from the general rule; or whether,
on the contrary, ex-Communist countries too,
conform to the general pattern with a close cor-
relation between the advance of political and
civic freedom on one hand, and economic de-
velopment and reform on the other.
According to the Table 3 shown below, they
do conform to the general pattern. In the transi-
tion countries too, the consolidation of democ-
racy and the development of a market economy
are mutually compatible. We measure their eco-
nomic reform with the “transition indicators” as
they are published by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development – EBRD in its
annual “Transition Report”. This composite in-
dex reflects the advances in the reform of eco-
nomic policies and institutions (like privatisation
or liberalisation). We correlate that index with
the Freedom House indicators we already used
in Table 1. This too is a composite index and
measures the degree of political and civic free-
dom with the best score being 1, and the worst a
8. Obviously, there is a close correlation between
the two indices. Those most advanced in eco-
nomic reform are also the ones most advanced
in the consolidation of democracy.
Correlations are just that. They show that two
phenomena occur together. But we want to know
more. We want to know what causes what. Does
a favourable economic development promote
democracy; so that one should concentrate on
this economic development, being confident that
it would be followed later on and more or less
automatically by progress on the way towards
democracy? Or would it be the other way round?
Would freedom and democracy be the neces-
sary base, the essential precondition for well
functioning markets? And would these markets
become established and consolidated more or
less automatically once a democratic polity has
become established?
Countless arguments are offered to substanti-
ate either the claim for the priority of democ-
racy or for the priority of markets. Just to name
a few:
1.Markets build and sustain the civil society that
is the base for democracy.
Table 3
Correlation Between the EBRD Transition Indicators and
Political/Civic Freedom
Source: Freedom House 2000; EBRD 2000.
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2.Markets teach an “each for himself” and thus
destroy the foundation of reciprocity and
communality necessary for democracy.
3.Markets accentuate differences in income and
status that are inimical to democracy.
4.Democracy implies so strong a quest for
equality that it impedes the development of
efficient markets.
And so on. As mentioned the list of possible
arguments is as long as the duration of the de-
bate. But how does the public in the transition
countries themselves view the issue? Accord-
ing to surveys it judges the results of democra-
tisation also in light of its economic status (Hayo
1999). These surveys show that public support
for democratic governance becomes linked, in
the end, to the perception of one’s own fate on
the roller coaster of economic transition.
The better in a given post-Communist coun-
try the relative economic situation of the indi-
vidual household, the higher the support for
democracy. This does not imply that households
with a bad economic situation cannot be demo-
cratic. But it shows that in the last few years
rising levels of wealth have produced higher
levels of support for democracy, while on the
other hand a deteriorating economy has nega-
tively affected the support for democracy.
The above table shows that support for de-
mocracy is stronger in wealthier households; and
stronger in wealthier transition countries. But
this relationship is neither automatic nor uni-
versal. For in surveys done several years ago,
the political reaction to economic misery or to
economic well-being is far less pronounced
(Rose/Mishler 1996). Older editions of the
“New Democracies Barometer” show that for
many years after 1989, the political reactions
were not that closely linked to the perceived
efficiency and justice of the economic system.
As it seems, democracy was appreciated as such
(Nowotny 1994), irrespective of whether it was
associated with wealth or misery (Härpfer/Rose
1994). Very often parties succeeded at the polls
even when promising nothing but sweat and
tears. Whereas some parties were voted out of
office who had promised nothing but ease and
comfort for everyone. Evidently, voters were not
just motivated by the all exclusive goal of a
higher income, or by the prospect of other ma-
terial benefits.
In a sense, democracy is not just a simple ar-
rangement and a simple status, but an ideal and
a permanent process. In that sense, even long
established democracies are far from perfect. In
many transition countries the distance to the
ideal is wider still. Nonetheless, the satisfaction
with the democratic political regime depends
less on the distance to such an abstract ideal. It
depends much more on the distance to the past.
In countries like Bulgaria or Romania, the pre-
ceding Communist regime had been ruthlessly
totalitarian and had crushed all vestiges of civil
society. In view of this past, Bulgarians and
Romanians are rather satisfied with the work-
ing of their democracy. In view of what they
experienced in the past, they appreciate the
present political system, though it is less per-
fect than that of some of the more Western tran-
sition countries, and though it has been associ-
ated with substantial economic hardship. This
attitude is different in countries in which Com-
munism had been more benign – as it had been
in the end in Hungary or Slovenia. In these coun-
tries people are not that certain that their present
political system is that much better than the pre-
vious one.
Table 4
Relative Wealth and Support for Democracy
Percentage of Households Supporting Democracy
(in households of different economic comfort; as
measured by the answer to the question: how satis-
fied are you with the situation of your household to-
day)
Satisfactory Very Satisfactory
Household Household
Poland 74 89
Slovakia 62 80
Croatia 34 70
Slovenia 56 64
Czech Rep 67 61
Hungary 70 57
Romania 76 57
Bulgaria 71 50
Belarus 58 42
Ukraine 33 38
Source: Härpfer, Christian/Richard Rose, Principal
Investigators, New Democracies Barometer V, 1998.
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Nonetheless, in the very long run and after
long lasting economic hardship, a political party
that supports a government will lose support and
voters as this party becomes identified with
sheer hopelessness. In the long run, a very infe-
rior economic performance will even affect the
political system as such as it then comes to be
seen as unjust and illegitimate. It is therefore
not surprising that eleven years after the demise
of Communism and with the grave deficiencies
of Communism slowly slipping from the gen-
eral consciousness, economic performance has
started to impact more strongly on attitudes to-
wards democratic governance. As demonstrated
in Table 4, the relation has become a closer one:
those better off tend to support more strongly a
democratic governance.
If these surveys provide us but with an other
set of correlations, they nonetheless also give at
least a hint of an answer to our basic question
as to what come first and as to what causes what:
in the countries of Central/Eastern Europe, citi-
zens are generally more satisfied with the po-
litical regime, and less satisfied with the eco-
nomic one. This would not be the case were ef-
ficient markets and rising wealth essential for
the establishment of democracy. Because the
majority of these countries has not become
wealthier. Only four of them – Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia – have managed to reach
the level of wealth that was theirs at the eve of
the Communist era. And even in these coun-
tries, a sharp rise in inequality has excluded a
large part of the population from profiting from
the new riches.
We can throw some further light upon the re-
lationship between democratic consolidation
and economic transition by comparing the re-
cent economic and political developments in the
CIS (that is the successor states of the Soviet
Union minus the Baltic Republics) with those
in other transition countries.
These charts (Tables 6 and 7) show that in
both groups of countries, democratic reforms
precede economic ones. The ready explanation
is that the formal institutions of democracy can
be established quite rapidly, but not so those in-
stitutions – like entrepreneurship and private
property – that are essential for the functioning
of a market economy (Stiglitz 1999).
But both economic reform and democratic
consolidation progressed more slowly in the CIS
countries (Zakaria 1997). There is yet an other
difference between the CIS countries and the
Table 5
Satisfaction with Democracy in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Slovenia
(attitudes to the current political system)
Source: Härpfer/Rose 1998.
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Tables 6 and 7
Advance in Economic Reform and in Civic and Political Rights
(a comparison of CIS countries with other transition countries)
Source: Freedom House 2000; EBRD 2000 (for practical purposes, the EBRD transi-
tion indicator – that originally has 5 as its maximum and optimal number, has been
translated into a 1 to 10 scale. On the other hand, the Freedom House indicator has been
reversed with 10 being the optimal and 1 the worst mark.
* CEEBS stands for Centre East European and Baltic states.
transition countries of Central/Eastern Europe.
In the latter, democratic transition was quite
complete, with democratic institutions replac-
ing the Communist ones fully and soon. This
faster democratic transition has not imperilled
or slowed their economic transformation. And
one might rightfully ask, whether, on the con-
trary, it had not been accelerated by a more vivid
democracy.
What Causes behind the Difficulties?
This close match of developments in the po-
litical and in the economic realm can not be
merely accidental and one is thus led to assume
that developments in both spheres are the result
of the same underlying causes.
One of these causes is the historic legacy.
Obviously, the difficulties on the way towards
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democracy and markets also reflect the herit-
age of pre-Communist times. Countries or re-
gions that had always been remote from tradi-
tional centres of modernisation still continue to
suffer from this disadvantage and this at a time
when low transportation costs would seem to
have made irrelevant the geographic location of
a country.
Countries and regions modernise at an uneven
speed. Some pull ahead, some are left behind.
Some improve their relative rank and some fall
behind in relative rank. But such changes are
usually very slow. Generally, those ahead stay
ahead for quite some time. Countries that have
lagged far behind manage but rarely to move
up into the group of those that are most advanced
(Galbraith 1964). In this context, geography
becomes relevant. Countries geographically
close to others who are already more advanced,
have themselves a better chance to pull ahead
too.
Many of the transition countries, however,
could not profit from such a fortunate geo-
graphic location. For centuries they have been
surrounded by other, also less “modern” coun-
tries. And they continue to suffer from that fact
even today. The farther removed from the his-
toric centres of modernisation (located in Eu-
rope somewhere in the triangle between the
Rhine Valley, Northern France and Southern
England3 ), the further behind even now in the
reform and transformation of their economy.
This historic cleavage, this geographic disad-
vantage has now been accentuated by Commu-
nism. As we have seen in Table 1, Communism
has pushed the countries back below the level
they otherwise would have attained, had they
also developed under a democratic regime and
as market economies. Evidently, this noxious
effect has been deeper where Communism had
lasted longest – namely in the countries that had
been part of the former Soviet Union.
Table 8
Distance from Western European Centres of Early Modernisation and Progress
in Economic Reform
Source: Sachs1997. This paper is based upon a complex, multifactor analysis and investi-
gates the “weight” of several variables that have been used to explain the wide and growing
divergence in the economic performance of the transition countries. Sachs finds that all such
factors pale into near total insignificance against the sole factor of “geographic location”
(which he measures not just by the simple physical distance from the “West”, but by using a
“gravity model” that multiplies this physical distance by the relative economic weight of each
country or region.
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Communism has also aggravated one other
historic burden. It has slowed and complicated
state- and nation building (Gärtner, 1995;
Gellner 1991). At the beginning of the 19th Cen-
tury, just four states existed in the space defined
by a quadrangle formed by the Western-most,
and the Eastern-most end of the Baltic Sea and
by the Western-most and Eastern-most end the
Adriatic sea respectively.4 These states or em-
pires – the Ottoman, the Austro Hungarian, the
German, and the Russian/Soviet, dissolved one
after the other. Now the same geographic space
is filled by no less than 23 states. As it seems,
theses centrifugal forces are still powerful. Since
1990 not only the Soviet Union has broken up,
but with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia two
more other multi-ethnic states. In the latter case
of Yugoslavia, splintering might continue even
further if no longer restrained by international,
armed intervention.
The process of process of state and nation
building thus is still very young in the region.
Not in all cases has it been complete and/or suc-
cessful. At first sight, this should surprise, for
Communism was identified with the notion and
need of a strong state. It also saw as its mission
to transcend and obliterate the divisive forces
of nationalism, to consolidate states and to lower
ethnic tensions as they had always had existed
in the region. In its final effect and in this realm
too, Communism had produced exactly the op-
posite of what it pretended to provide. In West-
ern Europe multi-ethnic states like Spain or
Belgium could until now manage and contain
some rather virulent ethnic tensions. This has
not been the case in the realm of former Com-
munism. Here, on occasions, even international
borders seem less certain and permanent than
in the Western part of the continent. The pros-
pects of escalating inter-ethnic tensions continue
to haunt a number of Central/Eastern European
countries.
The newness of states implies that their insti-
tutions and administrations are young too. As a
consequence, rules are untested and the civil
service without great routine and experience.5
This disadvantage too, was aggravated by Com-
munism. Among the Communist regimes and
countries, the actual practice and the actual func-
tioning of public institutions differed much more
widely than generally assumed. What all of these
administrations shared nonetheless was a lack
of public acceptance and legitimacy.6 This is
nicely expressed in the adage that “everybody
knew that those in charge of the public institu-
tions lied; and everybody knew that those in
charge of public institutions knew that the popu-
lation knew that they lied”. The population thus
did not “own” these institutions. These were
perceived as not serving the interest of the popu-
lation, but as serving the interest of those in
power. This leads us back to the general ques-
tion as to why in so many of the transition coun-
tries public institutions continue to function so
badly, and as to why this default is the more
serious the further to the East one moves.
As we can not but fail to realise, eleven years
after the onset of transition, the economic trans-
formation remains incomplete and threatened by
recurrent crises. Democracy is still not fully
consolidated if one implies that this would re-
quire the political structures to have become as
stable as those in Western Europe. This outcome
is not the one predicted by the so called
“transitologists” who had taken their cues from
the earlier switches from non democratic to
democratic regimes as they had occurred in
Latin America and Southern Europe (Hun-
tington 1992; Linz/Stepan 1996). Based on such
precedence, they had predicted that the neces-
sary changes would have become completed in
a much shorter period of time (Müller 1996).
At the outset therefore – and for quite some time
thereafter – expectations for and in Central/
Eastern Europe had been conditioned by these
predictions of “transitologists”. We should thus
establish how and why they erred. For erred they
have not only in predicting a relatively short
phase of transition and consolidation; but also
in describing the mechanism of transition and
the consequences of various scenarios of tran-
sition.
They predicted, for instance, widely differ-
ing outcomes for a “pacted transition” on one
side, with the outgoing old and the incoming
new elites negotiating the change-over; and, on
the other side, a transition that occurred as a
consequence of a simple collapse of the old re-
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gime (Schmitter 1994; Huntington 1992). These
distinctions had some explanatory power. But
it was a limited one which can longer provide
convincing evidence on the reasons for the dif-
ference that exist nowadays between the vari-
ous countries of Central/Eastern Europe. In Po-
land and Hungary for instance, transition was
“pacted”. These two countries now closely re-
semble the Czech Republic were this was not
the case and where the old regime had simply
collapsed. But there are vast differences between
the Czech Republic and Romania, notwithstand-
ing the fact that in Romania too, the old regime
had disappeared through a collapse.
“Social Capital”
So why this failure of “transitology”? The best
answer seems to be that Communism simply
could not be compared to any of the non-demo-
cratic regimes in Latin America or Southern
Europe. While dictators in Southern Europe and
Latin America had added some etatist or
corporatist elements and a large quantity of au-
tarky, the economic systems had remained ba-
sically capitalist nonetheless. Of course this was
not the case under Communist regimes with their
centrally planned economies and their state
ownership of the means of production. Thus not
only the political systems, but the economic
systems too were subject to a wholesale change
after 1989 (Beyme 1996) . This double burden
has certainly complicated and prolonged the
change-over.
A second and equally important difference to
other transitions to democracy arises from the fact
that under Communism, the countries of Cen-
tral/Eastern Europe had passed through a phase
of totalitarian rule at least for some time. Con-
trary to the predictions of Jean Kirkpatrick (1982),
this has not prevented them from changing and
becoming “post-totalitarian”. But the phase of
totalitarian governance had nonetheless deep ef-
fects upon these societies. This heritage seems to
be one of the main causes of the uneven and fre-
quently very inferior performance of public, eco-
nomic and political institutions. For clearly, these
institutions function least well were the weight
of totalitarianism has lasted the longest – as for
instance in the CIS – or where it was the heaviest
– as in Albania, Romania or Bulgaria.
In order to be effective, institutions must be
trusted. People must be ready and willing to use
them and perceive of them as facilitating that
sort of co-operation modern states and modern
economies can not do without (Fukuyama
1995). But it is exactly this readiness to co –
operate even with anonymous partners and
through public institutions; it is exactly this trust
in public institutions; it is this essential “ social
capital” that has been destroyed by Communism
(Rose 1997); and that had been destroyed espe-
cially in the totalitarian phase of Communism.
Citizens became reduced to their private sphere
and took distance from public institutions. These
institutions were perceived as sham; as not
theirs. They were not seen to serve the interest
of the common Mr Average.
Table 9
Trust in Public Political and
Economic Institutions
question: do you trust the justice system;
answer in percentages
a great quite not very
deal  a lot much
France 5,4 40,9 34,3
Germany 9,0 38,1 39,0
Austria 15,0 53,1 27,4
CEECs 7,4 23,7 44,1
question: do you trust the police;
answer in percentages
a great quite not very
deal  a lot much
France 13,1 53,8 22,6
Germany 9,5 61,6 25,2
Austria 21,6 53,6 21,0
CEECs 6,8 33,6 43,0
Source: Europe value studies 1999; for 14 CEECs: the
non weighted average.
As the above table shows, this damage caused
by Communism has not been undone in the
meantime (Plasser/Przibersky 1998). The dis-
trust in anything public persists; and those po-
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litical institutions are least trusted which like the
government, civil servants or political parties
are at the same time the most essential ones.
Surprisingly, private enterprise does not fare
much better.
Trust is an essential part of what has been
termed “social capital” (Coleman 1989). The
whole notion and definition of “social capital”
is hotly debated; as is the issue whether it in-
creases, remains constant or becomes depleted
in late capitalist societies.7 But it is difficult to
deny that a whole complex stock of attitudes,
expectations, traditions and moral norms does
indeed underpin our capacity to work together
in and through public institutions. This capac-
ity depends on how intensely people relate to
one another; on what social and other distances
such relations cover; it depends on the nature
and purpose of such relationships; and it depends
upon whether such relations cluster around pub-
lic institutions.
Not all types of “social capital” are benign in
their effect (Härpfer/Wallace 2000). As men-
tioned, some types of social capital are essen-
tial for the good functioning of institutions. But,
on the other hand, a certain stock of social rela-
tions might have come into existence that are
partly the cause and partly the result of a failure
of public institutions. This holds true, for in-
stance, for the social networks underpinning
criminal or black market activities.
Decisive in the further political and economic
development is therefore not just the volume of
social capital that existed at the end of the com-
munist era; but also the type and quality of this
social capital. In some of the countries, Com-
munism had reduced “social capital” or it had
transformed it to a degree that prevented insti-
tutions from functioning properly. That failure
has very negative long term consequences. As
many other social or economic developments,
transition too can be perceived as being a learn-
ing process; and thus a path determined and
cumulative process. Once the process has started
to run in a certain direction, it feeds upon itself
and becomes difficult to reverse.
Lacking the motive and reason to trust public
institutions, citizens in some of the transition
countries skirted them and in doing so set in
motion a spiral of negative feed-back that re-
sulted in even greater distrust. Distrusted insti-
tutions are, of course, less efficient. And this
lack of efficiency then lowers the already low
level of trust they enjoy; and so on. This feed-
back loop thus lowers expectations vested in
institutions and thus weakens the legitimacy, the
efficiency and the support for such institutions.
It is the absence of an other feed-back loop
that also impairs the legitimacy and efficiency
of public institutions in the Communist and post-
Communist era. Under Communism, societies
and the polity were organised top-down. Insti-
tutions were not dependent on their clients; en-
terprises not upon their customers; politicians
not on voters. Being not dependent upon those
they pretend to serve, institutions are under no
constraint to adapt and learn. Slowly, they grew
distant to reality and thus became dysfunctional,
whereas their clients were thrown back upon
themselves. Instead of building social capital
around such institutions, they build it around
relatives and friends; or in the counter world of
criminal or black market activity.
These are no iron clad laws, but mere possi-
bilities and probabilities. The actual course of
events will – of course – also depend on politi-
cal leadership and on political choices. Even
“path-determination” still leaves room for them.
Developments in, for instance, Bulgaria and
Romania have shown that a country can travel
upon such a slippery path up to a point where,
in a general crisis, the cards have to be dealt
again; and when a new beginning becomes pos-
sible. Unlike physical processes, political ones
still leave ample room for value judgement and
decisions.
But still, the destruction of the habit, of the
willingness and the capacity to trust – this whole-
sale destruction of social capital has to be
counted among the worst, the most pernicious,
but also among the most enduring legacies of
Communism.
Conclusions
There are no mono-causal explanations for the
difficulties encountered by the countries of Cen-
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tral/Eastern Europe on the path of democratic
consolidation and on the path of economic re-
form. But it is certain that these countries have
fallen further back in comparison to the coun-
tries of Western Europe; and it is certain that
this must be due mainly to Communism and to
its social, cultural, political and economic legacy.
The most pernicious part of this legacy is an
uneven and frequently inferior actual function-
ing of public institutions. This, on its turn, is
due to these institutions not having gained suf-
ficient trust and other social support. Instead of
social capital that would have become amassed
around these public institutions and that would
support them, an other type of social capital has
been accumulated. It consists of informal rela-
tions among closely connected persons and sup-
ports the alternative to the public world: namely
the grey economy, criminal activities and, in
politics, clientilism. Such negative processes are
path determined and thus cumulative. It is diffi-
cult – though not impossible – to reverse them.
NOTES
1 In Western Europe itself, but also in East Asia, de-
mocratisation followed economic development which
had created a middle class that many believe to be a
pre-condition and necessary base for democratic gov-
ernance.
2 If one excepts Turkey whose position had deterio-
rated – but only slightly so.
3 With some tongue in cheek some propose the centre
of this centre to be Brussels.
4 if one excepts the mini – state of Montenegro which
had been independent since the Middle Ages
5 This is one of the reasons why the CEECs could not
follow an “Asian way” of “development capitalism”
as this mode of modernisation depends upon power-
ful and efficient bureaucracies (Stiglitz 1999)
6 The legitimacy and effectiveness of the official ad-
ministration was also weakened by the existence of
a double chain of command: one provided by the
official administrative institutions; and the other, of-
ten the more effective one, provided by the different
units of the Communist Party.
7 Very likely though, it makes positive, and at that a
strongly positive contribution to economic develop-
ment (Knack/Keefer 1997).
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